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•  The recent global crisis is a prime example of the 
substantial impact that periods of high ﬁ  nancial 
sector stress can have on the real economy. 
Indeed, this crisis clearly demonstrates that the 
real economy and the ﬁ  nancial sector can under-
mine each other, with ﬁ  nancial stress and weak 
output feeding each other.
•  This article examines the potential for non-linear 
relationships between ﬁ  nancial stress, monetary 
policy, and the real economy by surveying the 
relevant literature and estimating a model with 
Canadian data.
•  The research summarized indicates that the 
economy can be characterized by regimes of 
low and high ﬁ  nancial stress and that monetary 
policy can inﬂ  uence the likelihood of transitioning 
between the two regimes.
•  It also implies that monetary policy actions have 
stronger effects when ﬁ  nancial stress is high and 
that tightening monetary policy tends to have 
more impact than easing.
A
lthough there have been various episodes of 
high ﬁ  nancial stress (e.g., the recession of the 
early 1980s, the Asian crisis of the 1990s, the 
1998 LTCM scare, and the high-tech bust of the early 
2000s), the recent crisis has been remarkable for the 
intensity of the negative feedback process between 
ﬁ  nancial sector developments and the real economy 
that characterized it. Policy-makers had to take 
exceptional measures to break this process, in par-
ticular, reducing interest rates to historic lows. While 
policy actions were successful at reducing ﬁ  nancial 
stress, the crisis nevertheless stimulated interest in 
the relationship between ﬁ  nancial sector develop-
ments, the real economy, and monetary policy. This 
article brieﬂ  y reviews the economic literature on this 
topic, focusing on studies that allow for non-linear 
relationships between monetary policy, ﬁ  nancial stress, 
and the real economy. 
Results obtained from an empirical model estimated 
with Canadian data and allowing for the presence of 
two ﬁ  nancial-stress regimes are also presented. The 
methodology used builds upon Balke (2000), and 
ﬁ  nancial stress is measured with the index proposed 
by Illing and Liu (2006), which was designed to reﬂ  ect 
tensions in the Canadian ﬁ  nancial system. 
Selective Literature Review 
Seminal contributions by economists as diverse as 
Knut Wicksell, Irving Fisher, and Friedrich von Hayek 
have emphasized the role that ﬁ  nancial sector develop-
ments play in explaining economic ﬂ  uctuations.
1 More 
recent contributions have examined the potential for 
non-linear or amplifying relationships between ﬁ  nancial 
stress, monetary policy, and other economic variables 
(i.e., the relationship between these variables may not 
be proportional).
1  See Laidler (2007) for an excellent discussion.
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corroborates a prediction of Blinder’s (1987) model.
Like McCallum, Galbraith (1996) uses a single-equation 
model. However, while in McCallum’s work credit 
regimes are determined exogenously, Galbraith’s 
model allows for endogenously determined threshold 
effects (i.e., the economy can be in different credit 
regimes with different economic relationships). He 
ﬁ  nds evidence of such effects for the United States 
but not for Canada. The absence of a credit variable 
in Galbraith’s model might explain his mixed results.
Since the empirical exercise presented in this article 
builds largely on Balke (2000), we discuss his approach 
in more detail. It consists of (i) selecting and estimating 
a four-variable threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) 
model with U.S. economic data; (ii) testing formally for 
the presence of threshold effects; and (iii) analyzing 
impulse responses to see if they reveal signs of non-
linear propagation of shocks across the regimes iden-
tiﬁ  ed by the threshold model. Balke uses the yield 
spread between commercial paper and Treasury Bills 
to identify credit regimes. The other variables included 
in his TVAR model are real output, inﬂ  ation, and a 
monetary variable (approximated by M2 growth or the 
federal funds rate). Balke ﬁ  nds strong evidence of 
threshold effects related to credit conditions. He also 
ﬁ  nds that, on average, tightening monetary policy (a 
higher interest rate or slower growth rate of money) 
has larger effects than easing.
4 In addition, he ﬁ  nds 
that monetary shocks have larger effects in the tight-
credit regime. 
Various studies have used approaches similar to that 
of Balke. For example, Atanasova (2003) ﬁ  nds signiﬁ  -
cant evidence of threshold effects with models applied 
to U.K. data. In addition, she ﬁ  nds that monetary 
policy has a greater impact when credit is tighter. 
However, she also ﬁ  nds that the effects of positive 
and negative monetary policy shocks are symmetric. 
It is important to note that most of the studies men-
tioned use market-speciﬁ  c measures of ﬁ  nancial 
stress. For instance, Balke focuses on the commercial 
paper market, ignoring potential stresses in other 
markets. To address this limitation, the empirical 
exercise presented here uses a ﬁ  nancial stress index 
(FSI) designed to reﬂ  ect tensions in various Canadian 
credit markets.
4  A related literature, using different approaches, generally reaches the same conclusion: 
monetary tightening has a stronger impact than monetary easing. See, for instance, 
Cover (1992) and Karras (1996). In contrast, Weise (1999) ﬁ  nds that the effects are 
symmetric.
For example, Blinder (1987) presents a theoretical 
model with credit frictions (imperfect information about 
borrowers) in which the economy can enter credit-
rationing regimes in which some creditworthy bor-
rowers cannot access credit. This could be caused 
by tight monetary policy, which Blinder deﬁ  nes as a 
decrease in central bank reserves. Output growth is 
lower in such a regime, since a tighter monetary policy 
can imply that businesses lose access to credit, 
amplifying non-linearly the effects of the monetary 
policy tightening (over and above more traditional 
effects on investment and consumption).
2
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) present a model with 
agency costs in which changes in borrowers’ balance 
sheets can give rise to a “ﬁ  nancial accelerator” ampli-
fying ﬂ  uctuations in output. In their model, negative 
exogenous “technology” and “balance-sheet” shocks 
are likely to have a greater effect than positive shocks, 
because ﬁ  nancing constraints likely become binding 
only after a certain level of borrowing. Subsequent 
work extended this analysis to models that include 
monetary policy. For instance, Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) discuss models in which the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on real spending can be magniﬁ  ed 
through a higher premium on external ﬁ  nancing (the 
cost of ﬁ  nancing a project through borrowing minus 
that of using internal funds). They also discuss a bank-
lending channel through which a bank’s ﬁ  nancial 
situation also acts as an accelerator mechanism. 
More recently, Adrian and Shin (2009) argue that the 
effects of monetary policy can be ampliﬁ  ed through 
impacts on the balance sheets of other types of ﬁ  nan-
cial intermediaries.
3
Even though these models differ in various dimensions, 
they all imply non-linear dynamics between ﬁ  nancial 
stress, monetary policy, and the real economy, and 
they provide a theoretical rationale for empirical 
analyses of non-linear and regime-dependent rela-
tionships between the degree of ﬁ  nancial stress, 
monetary policy, and economic activity.
One example of such an exercise is McCallum (1991). 
He uses U.S. data to estimate a simple output equation 
in which the coefﬁ  cient associated with the monetary 
variable (M1 in one version) changes when the economy 
is thought to be in a regime of credit rationing. He ﬁ  nds 
that monetary tightening has stronger effects (output
2  Azariadis and Smith (1998) also present a model with endogenously determined credit-
rationing regimes.
3  The “ﬁ  nancial accelerator” ideas popularized by Bernanke and Gertler have generated a 
large literature that Bernanke (2007) summarizes in non-technical terms. There have been 
attempts to integrate these ideas in policy models; for example, Christensen et al. (2009).
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are selected based on a literature review and are 
weighted by the relative size of the market to which 
they pertain in Canadian total credit. This weighting 
approach produced an index that could ﬁ  t episodes 
of ﬁ  nancial stress identiﬁ  ed in a survey of Bank of 
Canada senior managers and economists. It is 
important to note that movements in the FSI could be 
caused by shocks originating outside Canada. This is 
because foreign developments can affect Canadian 
variables captured by the FSI and because the FSI 
includes foreign economic variables, such as volatility 
in the Can$/US$ exchange rate and the spread 




The sample period is 1981Q4 to 2009Q4.
8 All series 
are quarterly. Chart 1 presents the time series for the 
growth rate of real GDP, inﬂ  ation, the real overnight 
rate, and the FSI—the threshold variable. For refer-
ence, periods with signiﬁ  cant economic events are 
shaded. Table 1 presents tests of a linear VAR model 
against a TVAR alternative, as well as the estimated 
threshold values for the FSI. The test results in 
Table 1 provide strong evidence against linearity in 
the VAR model and in favour of the TVAR speciﬁ  ca-
tion. Whether this non-linearity results in economically 
meaningful asymmetry in the effects of monetary 
policy shocks, however, must be determined by 
examining the dynamic effects of these shocks in the 
TVAR model.
7  The index also includes the following variables: the spread between yields on bonds 
issued by Canadian ﬁ  nancial institutions and the yields on government bonds of 
comparable duration; the yield spread on Canadian non-ﬁ  nancial corporate bonds; the 
inverted term spread (i.e., the 90-day treasury bill rate minus the 10-year government 
yield); the beta derived from the total return index for Canadian ﬁ  nancial institutions; 
TSX GARCH volatility; the average bid/ask spread on Canadian treasury bills; and the 
spread between Canadian commercial paper rates and rates on treasury bills of compara-
ble duration. See Illing and Liu (2006) for more details.
8  The sample used by Li and St-Amant (2010) is 1981Q4 to 2006Q4. In addition, total 
inﬂ  ation is used in the working paper, instead of the core inﬂ  ation measure used here. 
Most results are qualitatively the same, but the longer sample provides more evidence 
that monetary shocks have a larger impact on output when ﬁ  nancial stress is high.
The Model 
Within the class of possible non-linear models, we 
concentrate on the TVAR model. Such a model pro-
vides a relatively simple and intuitive way to formulate 
non-linearity, such as regime switching, asymmetry, 
and multiple equilibriums, implied by the theoretical 
models of ﬁ  nancial and macroeconomic activity. A 
TVAR model works by splitting time series endogen-
ously into different regimes. The role of ﬁ  nancial-
stress conditions as a non-linear propagator of 
shocks is captured by a TVAR model containing four 
variables: Canadian real output growth, inﬂ  ation, the 
real overnight rate, and a ﬁ  nancial stress index.
Although the FSI is the chosen threshold variable, 
because all the variables included in the model are 
endogenous, shocks to output, inﬂ  ation, the overnight 
rate, and to ﬁ  nancial-stress conditions may induce a 
shift to a different ﬁ  nancial-stress regime.
5
Although the FSI is the chosen 
threshold variable, because all 
the variables included in the model 
are endogenous, shocks to output, 
inﬂ  ation, the overnight rate, and to 
ﬁ  nancial-stress conditions may induce a 
shift to a different ﬁ  nancial-stress regime.
In addition, we assume that the TVAR model has a 
recursive structure, with the causal ordering as fol-
lows: output growth, inﬂ  ation, the real overnight rate, 
and the ﬁ  nancial-stress variable. This ordering implies 
that monetary policy shocks are shocks to short-term 
interest rates and do not have a contemporaneous 
impact on output or inﬂ  ation. This is consistent with 
the view that monetary policy shocks affect output 
and inﬂ  ation only after a lag. Monetary policy shocks 
can, however, have a contemporaneous impact on the 
FSI. This assumption reﬂ  ects the view that ﬁ  nancial 
variables can respond very quickly to all types of 
shocks.
6 
Financial stress is measured using the index for 
Canada proposed by Illing and Liu (2006). The index is 
a continuous variable composed of various measures 
5  See Li and St-Amant (2010) for more details about the methodology.
6  Balke (2000) and Atanasova (2003) use similar assumptions, as do various other 
empirical models of monetary policy.









FSI 50.58 134.32 63.85 0.00
Note: The delay for the threshold variable is given by d =1, and the lag of the TVAR is 3. 
The p-values are calculated by Hansen’s (1996) bootstrap method with 500 replications.
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expansionary shocks with the sign reversed. 
Regardless of the initial level
of ﬁ  nancial stress, a contractionary 
monetary shock has a stronger effect 
on output growth and the FSI 
than an expansionary shock.
Chart 2 provides some evidence of asymmetry in the 
effects of contractionary and expansionary monetary 
policy shocks on output growth and the FSI. This 
result indicates that regardless of the initial level of 
ﬁ  nancial stress, a contractionary monetary shock has 
a stronger effect on output growth and the FSI than 
an expansionary shock. This asymmetric response 
of output growth is consistent with the results of 
McCallum (1991), Balke (2000), Cover (1992), and 
The asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks are 
explored along three dimensions.
9 First, does a con-
tractionary policy shock (a higher real overnight rate 
than predicted by the model) have different effects 
than an expansionary policy shock? Second, do mon-
etary policy shocks have different effects in regimes of 
low and high ﬁ  nancial stress? Third, do shocks of 
different magnitudes have disproportionate effects?
Chart 2 presents the estimated impulse response of 
our four variables over 12 quarters to a one-time 
shock to the real overnight rate in regimes of low and 
high ﬁ  nancial stress. The size of the shock is set to 
the standard deviation of monetary policy shocks 
computed in the linear model. The responses to con-
tractionary shocks, along with their 95 per cent point-
wise conﬁ  dence band (calculated with the bootstrap 
9  Whereas in a linear model, one set of impulse-response functions is sufﬁ  cient to 
characterize the estimated model, in the non-linear case, the impulse-response 
functions are sensitive to the initial conditions and to the magnitude of the impulses. 
Details on computing the impulse-response functions for a TVAR model are discussed 
in Atanasova (2003). 
Chart 1:  Variables used and estimated threshold valuea
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a.  Shaded areas on each chart denote the events labelled in Chart 1a.
b.  LCD: Less-developed country
c.  ERM: Exchange rate mechanism
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Low-ﬁ  nancial-stress regime:  High-ﬁ  nancial-stress regime:
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higher probability of switching the economy into a 
high-stress regime than the absence of a monetary 
policy shock (Chart 4).
We ﬁ  nd that when the economy 
is initially in a regime of 
low ﬁ  nancial stress, a contractionary 
policy shock has a higher probability 
of switching the economy into a 
high-stress regime than the absence 
of a monetary policy shock.
Chart 3 displays information similar to that in Chart 2, 
except that regimes of high and low ﬁ  nancial stress 
are grouped together on the same chart instead of 
positive and negative shocks. This chart provides 
strong evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
effects of monetary policy shocks differ depending on 
the initial state of the economy. For instance, Chart 3 
shows that a contractionary shock to monetary policy 
causes more ﬁ  nancial stress and a greater decrease 
in output growth when the economy is in high ﬁ  nan-
cial stress than when it is in low ﬁ  nancial stress. 
Inﬂ  ation also responds more strongly. According to 
Blinder’s (1987) model of credit rationing, a tightening 
of monetary policy has stronger effects on the real 
Karras (1996). However, it differs from those of Weise 
(1999) and Atanasova (2003).
Chart 2 also shows that, when the economy is in a 
regime of low ﬁ  nancial stress, inﬂ  ation begins to fall 
quickly in response to a contractionary policy shock, 
and the negative responses persist for a quarter, after 
which the responses are positive. To explore the pos-
sible reasons for the positive responses, Table 2 
reports the average values of the four variables in 
different ﬁ  nancial regimes, indicating that, on average, 
in the high-ﬁ  nancial-stress regime, inﬂ  ation, the FSI, 
and the real overnight rate are higher, and output 
growth lower, than in the low-ﬁ  nancial-stress 
regime.
10 Obviously, one of the most important fea-
tures of the TVAR model is that shocks can cause 
regimes to change, suggesting that the impulse-
response functions depend not only on the original 
state of the economy at the time of the shock, but 
also on the current state of the economy. We also ﬁ  nd 
that when the economy is initially in a regime of low 
10  These are average values that do not need to repeat themselves in the future. For 
instance, the ongoing global ﬁ  nancial crisis appears to be associated with disinﬂ  ation, 
not inﬂ  ation. 
Chart 2:  Response to monetary policy shocks in different ﬁ  nancial-stress regimes (cont’d)
Low-ﬁ  nancial-stress regime:  High-ﬁ  nancial-stress regime:
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Table 2:  Mean values of variables in different regimes
Financial-
stress regime
 GDP growth 
rate  
Inﬂ  ation 
rate
Real 
overnight rate  FSI
Low stress  0.84 0.58 2.85 38.13
High stress 0.26 0.99 4.01 62.43
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BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     AUTUMN 2010Chart 3:  Response in different ﬁ  nancial-stress regimes experiencing a contractionary
or expansionary shock to monetary policy
Contractionary shock:  Expansionary shock:
a. Output growth  b. Output growth
e. Overnight rate  f. Overnight rate
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sionary shocks can increase the likelihood of moving 
to, or remaining in, a regime of low ﬁ  nancial stress. 
Larger shocks have more impact on the likelihood of 
regime switching. These results suggest that mon-
etary policy shocks have an impact on the FSI and 
play an important role in the evolution of ﬁ  nancial-
stress regimes.
sector when credit is already tight but weak effects 
when credit is initially plentiful. Hence, our empirical 
ﬁ  nding regarding the impact of a contractionary mon-
etary policy shock on output growth is consistent with 
Blinder’s view.
Chart 4 plots the estimated probability of a transition 
from one regime to the other. For comparison, the 
probability of such a transition in the absence of a 
monetary policy shock is also plotted. Chart 4 indi-
cates that contractionary monetary policy shocks can 
increase the likelihood of switching to, or staying in, 
Chart 3:  Response in different ﬁ  nancial-stress regimes experiencing a contractionary
or expansionary shock to monetary policy (cont’d)
Contractionary shock:  Expansionary shock:
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Chart 4:  Impact of monetary policy shocks on the probability of transition  
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for policy-makers to take into account 
the impact that their actions 
might have on ﬁ  nancial conditions.
The empirical models discussed in this article are 
simple, however, and care must be taken in inter-
preting the results. Also, Canada has experienced 
only a few episodes of very high ﬁ  nancial stress, and 
these could be driving our results. More research is 
needed before strong policy conclusions can be 
reached. In addition, our results should not be seen to 
imply that monetary policy should remain easy in 
order to avoid situations of high ﬁ  nancial stress. 
Another, related literature shows that excessive 
growth in credit and asset prices, associated with a 
monetary policy that is kept too easy for too long, can 
be a source of disequilibrium that may eventually 
result in high ﬁ  nancial stress.
11 Easy monetary policy 
could produce such developments. More generally, a 
monetary policy stance that is kept too easy for too 
long would cause inﬂ  ation and instability.
11  See Borio and Lowe (2002) for international evidence with a detailed discussion. See 
also Misina and Tkacz (2009) and Misina, St-Amant, and Tkacz (2008) for evidence and 
discussion in a Canadian context. Boivin, Lane, and Meh (2010) provide analysis, based 
on general-equilibrium models of how monetary policy can affect ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
Conclusions
Some previous research has emphasized the role that 
ﬁ  nancial sector developments could play in the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy. Both theor-
etical models and empirical ﬁ  ndings point to the 
possibility that there are non-linear relationships 
between monetary policy, the business cycle, and 
developments in the ﬁ  nancial sector.
Using Canadian data and a TVAR model that allows 
for such non-linear relationships, we obtain results 
that are generally consistent with the previous litera-
ture. That is, when the economy can move into dif-
ferent ﬁ  nancial-stress regimes, monetary policy 
actions can inﬂ  uence the likelihood of moving into 
these regimes, and monetary policy tightening 
appears to have more powerful effects, in general, 
than monetary policy easing. Moreover, the effects of 
tighter monetary policy are particularly large in 
regimes of high ﬁ  nancial stress.
These results point to the need for policy-makers to 
take into account the impact that their actions might 
have on ﬁ  nancial conditions. They also point to the 
need to be aware of the possibility that conditions in 
the ﬁ  nancial sector inﬂ  uence the effects of policy 
actions. These transmission mechanisms must be 
factored into the models used to guide monetary 
policy decisions. While progress has been made in 
developing such models, much remains to be done.
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